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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY- JURISDICTION - STATUTE EXTENDING ADMIRALTY JURISDIC· 
TION To INCLUDE AMPHIBIOUS TORTS REsULTING IN PERSONAL !NJURY-
Libelant linehandler, injured undocking a vessel, brought a personal in-
jury action against the shipowner. Leave to amend this complaint by 
naming the city of Los Angeles and a tugboat company as defendants was 
denied by the federal district court.1 Libelant then filed suit on the ad-
miralty side of the same district court against the city and the tugboat 
company on the identical cause of action. In ruling on respondents' ex-
ceptions to this libel, held, exceptions overruled. Upon establishing the 
constitutional validity of the Admiralty Extension Act,2 jurisdiction pur-
suant to its provisions can properly be exercised in the instant ship-to-
shore personal injury litigation. Fernatt v. City of Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 
89 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
Difficulties in defining the exact limits of the constitutional grant of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction3 have persisted throughout this 
country's history.4 With the decision in The Plymouth5 in 1865, it was 
established that admiralty tort jurisdiction was determined by locality. 
For a tort to be maritime in nature and cognizable in admiralty courts, 
it was essential that both the commission of the tortious act and the 
consummation of the damage or injury occur on the high seas or navigable 
waters, not on land or land extensions.6 As the volume and complexity 
of maritime commerce and the frequency of ship-to-shore torts increased, 
this judicial doctrine was attacked as an arbitrary and illogical historical 
accident.7 Nevertheless, relatively few finely-carved exceptions to the 
locality test developed,8 and the doctrine retained its vitality with the 
1 Fematt v. Nedlloyd Line, 191 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Cal. 1961) • Libelant was apparently 
ineligible for any seamen's or longshoremen's remedies. 
2 62 Stat. 496 (1948) , 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958) . 
3 U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. 
4 "The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious principle 
or of very accurate history." The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904) (Mr. Justice 
Holmes). 
r, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). 
6 "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether aboard a vessel or not, if 
upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance. • • • [I']he whole, 
or at least the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, must be complete 
within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends-on the high seas or navigable 
waters." Id. at 36. 
7 See Standing Committee on Admiralty and Maritime Law, Report, 55 A.B.A. REP. 
303, 305 (1930) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REP.]; Bruncken, Tradition and Common-
sense in Admiralty, 14 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 16 (1929); Farnum, Admiralty Jurisdiction and 
Amphibious Torts, 43 YALE L.J. 34 (1933) ; Olverson, Admiralty and the Amphibious 
Tort Problem, 29 VA. L. R.Ev. 1010 (1943); Ryan, The Amphibious Tort Problem in 
Collision Cases, 13 BROOKLYN L. R.Ev. 129 (1947) • 
s An "aid to navigation" exception was enunciated in The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 
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passage of time in both property damage and personal injury9 amphibious 
tort10 situations. No definitive judicial determination was ever made as 
to whether locality was the sole and exclusive test, or whether the maritime 
character of the particular tortious act was likewise a relevant jurisdictional 
consideration.11 
Grave inequities often developed from a mechanical application of the 
locality test to varying factual situations.12 Much agitation ensued for 
remedial legislative action to enable victims of amphibious torts to utilize 
admiralty procedures and remedies.13 Serious practical disadvantages had 
resulted from the relegation of such suitors, usually owners of damaged 
land structures, to nonadmiralty tribunals. Writers and scholars focused 
their attention on the property damage amphibious tort situation,14 and 
significantly, the act as originally proposed did not include personal injury 
torts.115 With constitutional problems deterring those seeking legislative 
extension of admiralty tort jurisdiction, a long and difficult statutory gesta-
tion period ensued.16 Finally enacted in 1948, the Admiralty Extension 
(1904) ; but see id. at 368 (concurring opinion) • Jurisdictional extensions beyond the 
locality test limits, in regard to seamen's and longshoremen's remedies, are strikingly 
indicated in O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943) and in 
Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950). 
O See, e.g., Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928); Netherlands American Steam 
Nav. Co. v. Gallagher, 282 Fed. 171 (2d Cir. 1922); Swayne & Hoyt, Inc. v. Barsch, 226 
Fed. 581 (9th Cir. 1915) • 
10 Coining of the phrase "amphibious torts," to refer to those situations where a 
wrongful act done afloat results in damage or injury ashore, is usually ascribed to Mr. 
Justice Brown; see Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort, 9 CoLUM. 
L. R.Ev. 1, 9 (1909) • 
11 See ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 74 (1939) ; Brown, supra note 10, at 8. See generally 
Atlantic Transport Co. v. lmbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914); Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction 
-Of Late Years, 37 HAR.v. L. REv. 529, 531-33 (1924); Shane, Jurisdiction of the Ad-
miralty over Torts, 66 U.S.L. R.Ev. 593 (1932); Stumberg, Tort Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 
4 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 306 (1926) • 
12 For a detailed discussion of these inequities, and of the sometimes strange results 
produced, see generally S. REP. No. 1593, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1948) ; H.R. REP. No. 
1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948); Ryan, supra note 7, at 137-42; Comment, 24 TUL. 
L. R.Ev. 453, 457 (1950); Note, 17 GEO. WAsH. L. R.Ev. 353, 356-57 (1949). 
13 See 55 A.B.A. REP. 303 (1930), 56 A.B.A. REP. 311 (1931), 59 A.B.A. REP. 397 
(1934) , 60 A.B.A. REP. 411 (1935) ; Bruncken, supra note 7, at 25; Farnum, supra note 
7, at 35; Olverson, supra note 7, at 1020. 
14 See, e.g., Farnum, supra note 7; Ryan, supra note 7, at 137. 
llS Note, 42 HAR.v. L. REv. 563 (1929) • Later proposed statutes included personal 
injury as well as property damage torts. Compare 56 A.B.A. REP. 311 (1931) with 60 
A.B.A. REP. 411 (1935) • See also H.R. REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1948) , 
where it is stated that the congressional purpose in enacting this legislation is to remedy 
inequities to owners of land structures resulting from a denial of admiralty jurisdiction. 
16 See, e.g., Bruncken, supra note 7, at 22; Farnum, supra note 7; Olverson, supra 
note 7, at 1021-27; Ryan, supra note 7, at 142-45. Compare 55 A.B.A. REP. 303 (1930) 
with 60 A.B.A. REP. 411 (1935) , where a significant shift in attitude toward the consti-
tutionality of the proposed legislation is indicated. Although introduced in the 74th 
Congress this bill was not passed until 1948 by the 80th Congress. 
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Act17 enlarges the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of federal courts to 
include those amphibious torts involving either property damage or per-
sonal injury which had previously been excluded by the locality doctrine. 
With statutory provisions enabling those victims of amphibious torts 
formerly restri1:ted to common law remedies to utilize, alternatively, the 
more flexible and effective admiralty processes, inequities resulting from 
application of the locality test were supposedly eliminated.18 But, though 
generally received favorably,19 doubts as to the act's constitutionality 
remained2°-doubts necessitating judicial resolution.21 Although no Su-
preme Court determination has as yet been made, two federal court 
decisions subsequent to the statute's enactment have squarely faced the 
question of its constitutional validity.22 In both of these cases the act was 
upheld as constitutional, as within the implied congressional power to 
legislate in regard to maritime matters.23 However, the factual settings 
of both decisions involved property damage, not personal injury. In the 
instant case, the court makes a perceptive distinction between property 
damage and personal injury, in regard to the act's constitutionality.24 While 
1'1' 62 Stat. 496 (1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958) • Pertinent statutory provisions state 
that the "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and 
include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on 
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated 
on land ..•• [S]uit may be brought in rem or in personam according to the principles 
of law and the rules of practice obtaining in cases where the injury or damage has 
been done and consummated on navigable water .... " 
18 See Note, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 353, 357•60 (1949), for a discussion of the act's 
practical effects. 
19 See, e.g., Fauver, The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction To Include Amphibious 
Torts, 37 GEO. L.J. 252, 259 (1949); Comment, 24 TuL. L. REv. 453, 460 (1950) • 
20 See Fauver, supra note 19, at 259-60; Vogel, Extension of Admiralty and Maritime 
Jurisdiction, 16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 191 (1950) ; Comment, 24 TuL. L. REv. 453 (1950) ; 
Note, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353, 360-61 (1949). Since the act authorized concurrent 
and not exclusive admiralty jurisdiction, no jury trial guarantee problem was presented. 
21 Three variously stated arguments in favor of the act's constitutionality arc: 
(1) that it does not extend jurisdictional limits nor create any new causes of action, 
but merely embodies a congressional directive to the courts to exercise already existing 
jurisdiction; (2) that it merely amends the substantive and procedural maritime law, 
and does not extend jurisdiction; and (3) that prior court decisions were construing 
the Judiciary Act, not the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction. On close 
inspection, all of these arguments are conclusory verbal formulae, begging the essential 
question of validity. 
22 United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953); American Bridge 
Co. v. The Gloria 0, 98 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). 
23 "What constituted an 'admiralty' or 'maritime' case, the founding fathers did not 
say, but they must have intended those words as embracing the broad subject matter 
of maritime law according to the general practices relating to it and at all times subject 
to definite provision by Congress and judicial decision within the reasonable scope of 
the terms used." United States v. Matson Nav. Co., supra note 22, at 612. 
24 "None of these cases involved injury to person. There is no mention in the 
Senate Report or in any of the accompanying letters of injury to person. • .• It may 
be granted that Congress has the power to set aside, and has in fact set aside, the 
1961] RECENT DECISIONS 211 
several federal courts have exercised jurisdiction under this statute in 
personal injury situations, in none of these cases was its constitutionality 
discussed or apparently disputed.25 
Although a de novo analysis of the act's constitutionality as to personal 
injury amphibious torts is certainly justifiable, it is extremely doubtful 
that this statute will be found unconstitutional, as regards either property 
damage or personal injury situations, when the question is finally adjudi-
cated.26 Sound and logical bases for its constitutional validity can be 
predicated. An implied congressional legislative power relating to mari-
time matters has long been recognized.27 Valid analogical precedents in 
which legislative extensions of admiralty jurisdiction were judicially up-
held are readily available.28 Also, the circumstances of necessity out of 
which this legislation arose,29 and the general liberality of the Supreme 
Court are significant operative factors. Even so, the holding in the instant 
decision, in its carefully-phrased conclusion, is somewhat uncertain and 
rather restricted to the particular factual situation.30 It is a reasonable 
assumption that the Supreme Court, in passing on the act's constitution-
'locality' test for admiralty jurisdiction over ship-to-shore torts. It may not be so quickly 
granted that the Act is constitutional, at least where the tort results in injury to person." 
Principal case at 91-92. 
25 E.g., Hovland v. Fearnley &: Eger, 110 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1952) ; Valerio v. 
American President Lines, 112 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) . 
20 Convincing arguments in favor of its constitutionality have frequently been made. 
See, e.g., GILMORE 8: BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 433 (1957); Fauver, supra note 
19; Knauth, The Landward Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction: the 1948 Statute, 35 
CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1949) . • 
27 The gradual development of a judicial recognition of an implied congressional 
power to modify the maritime law as changed conditions and experience dictated can 
be traced through various Supreme Court decisions. This implied power is usually 
grounded on the combination of the jurisdictional grant and the "necessary and proper" 
clause in the Constitution. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 
(1917); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924); Detroit Trust Co. v. The 
Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43-44 (1934); O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge &: Dock 
Co., 318 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1943). An excellent argument favoring such an implication is 
stated in The Oconee, 280 Fed. 927, 931-32 (E.D. Va. 1922). 
28 The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Richard-
son v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (19ll) ; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, supra 
note 27 (significant in upholding the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920) ; O'Donnell v. Great 
Lakes Dredge&: Dock Co., supra note 27. In Richardson v. Harmon, supra, the questioned 
statute was upheld although extending a shipowner's limitation of liability to non-
maritime torts. It is noted that the Supreme Court has never held unconstitutional 
any statute extending admiralty jurisdiction beyond previously established judicial limits. 
20 "But a very little history is sufficient to justify the conclusion that the Constitution 
does not prohibit what convenience and reason demand." The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 
361, 367 (1904) • 
30 "While the proof is far from conclusive, the force of . . . [various authority] is 
strong enough •.• to hold that the present tort is a maritime one and that Congress 
could constitutionally place it under the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts." 
Principal case at 93. 
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ality, will likewise limit its application to situations obviously maritime in 
nature. Such a limitation can be found expressly in the statute's language,81 
or implicitly as a necessary construction to uphold its constitutional valid-
ity. Thus, pursuant to the Admiralty Extension Act, the maritime character 
of the particular amphibious tort has supplanted locality as the jurisdic-
tional test. 82 
Even though held constitutional, the propriety of this jurisdictional 
extension to include personal injury amphibious torts, and especially of 
any additional expansion of admiralty jurisdiction, considered in perspec-
tive, is questionable. Separate admiralty jurisdiction ostensibly indicates 
an intelligible national interest in the expeditious and uniform handling, 
by competent tribunals employing flexible procedures, of the somewhat 
unique and specialized legal problems arising in the maritime industry.38 
Historically, there was a definite need in an incipient federal state for 
nationally-unified judicial administration of litigation concerning mari-
time and navigational matters, as an instrument of foreign policy.84 Excep-
tional and efficacious procedures and remedies of ancient origin and tra-
ditional usage were common to maritime courts in seafaring countries. 
These had developed principally because of the peculiar nature of the 
shipping industry, its devices and modes of operation, and were utilized 
to insure the continued smooth flow of international maritime com-
merce. Admittedly, a somewhat consistent trend toward jurisdictional 
broadening has characterized this country's judicial history. However, with 
the modem development of other equally unique, world-wide transporta-
tion and commercial media, the wisdom of any further enlargements of 
admiralty jurisdiction is dubious and arguably discriminatory. 
Arguments for extension of admiralty jurisdiction to include damage 
to land structures do not apply with equal force to personal injury cases. 
As the majority of such personal injury situations which arise are en-
compassed by seamen's and longshoremen's statutory and other specialized 
remedies, and injured suitors will usually prefer jury trials in non-
admiralty courts, the volume of personal injury suits will be quite small 
81 Especially in the phrase "caused by a vessel on navigable water." 62 Stat. 496 
(1948), 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958). Certain interpretative difficulties arising from this 
statutory language are presented. See Hovland v. Feamley &: Eger, 110 F. Supp. 657 
(E.D. Pa. 1952) • Regarding some other problems created or not settled by the act, 
see Note, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 353, 360 (1949). As to ambiguities in regard to the 
act's effects on longshoremen's statutory remedies, see 30 TEXAS L. REv. 625, 627 (1952) • 
82 Such had long been the accepted test of admiralty jurisdiction in contractual 
situations. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870). 
83 See generally Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 259 (1950); Bruncken, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
34 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534, 538 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton) ; Note, 67 HARv. 
L. REv. 1214 (1954). See generally Putnam, How the Federal Courts Were Given 
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1925) • 
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when compared with the number of property damage cases. The special 
expertise of admiralty tribunals is little needed in most personal injury 
amphibious tort situations,311 and pressure for statutory extension related 
exclusively to the property damage factual setting. Personal injury litiga-
tion in jury-equipped common law courts absolves admiralty judges from 
the onerous task of handling the difficult damage ascertainment problems 
of ten presented, and from writing detailed opinions justifying such de-
terminations. Importantly, providing an option to complainants to sue 
at law or in admiralty is an open invitation to "forum-shopping," with its 
insidious effects on the orderly administration of justice. 
Although the propriety of including personal injury amphibious torts 
is arguable, a narrow construction and limited application of the Admiralty 
Extension Act's provisions will accomplish the needed immediate reform 
while not unduly enlarging the scope of admiralty jurisdiction. Neverthe-
less, a purposeful jurisdictional distribution system, beyond the reach of 
this essentially remedial statute of narrow application, is badly needed in 
this area of the law.36 Basically, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
should be confined to those situations in which there exists a real and 
substantial relationship with the conduct of maritime affairs.BT While a 
thoroughgoing reorganization of jurisdictional concepts remains a necessity, 
history and logic indicate that the expansion of maritime jurisdiction has 
reached its high water mark with the 1948 statute. Any further enlarge-
ment is apt to produce more harm and confusion than concrete and bene-
ficial results. 
Francis X. Beytagh 
311 This assertion is grounded principally on the basic difference between the manner 
in which property damage and personal injuries typically occur. Moving ships or 
operating equipment thereof usually cause damage to shore structures, with intricate 
navigational and shiphandling questions often being presented. Personal injuries, on 
the other hand, arise from a variety of causal factors, with few involving technical 
issues of a maritime nature. 
36 See Black, supra note 33, at 273-80. 
87 Ibid. 
